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“The difference between utility and utility plus beauty is 
the difference between telephone wires and the spider web.” 
- Edwin Way Teale, September 18, CIRCLE OF THE SEASONS (1953) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This year, the modern biotech1 industry turns 40.2  Born with the 
advent of recombinant DNA technology, today’s biotech industry has 
flourished as an important area of clinical practice, research and 
development.  Biotechnology has become especially important in the 
realm of diagnostics.  Through the extraction, isolation, 
manipulation, comparison and analysis of biological compounds, 
biotechnology offers medicine a highly reliable way of assessing 
individual risk factors and treatment options for a vast array of 
conditions.  At the same time, the relationship of biotech patents to 
naturally occurring human biology has rendered biotech patents 
vulnerable to validity challenges, leading to significant uncertainty for 
an industry that relies heavily on large investments in research and 
development.3  Last year, the patent eligibility of diagnostic 
biotechnology was narrowed via the natural phenomenon doctrine in 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.;4
 1. In this article, “biotechnology” is used when serving as a noun, and “biotech” 
when serving as an adjective. 
 a 
 2. Biotechnology uses biological building blocks (such as amino acids, proteins, 
DNA and RNA) to engineer useful biomedical processes and products. See generally 
Lorance L. Greenlee, Biotechnology Patent Law: Perspective of the First Seventeen 
Years, Prospective on the Next Seventeen Years, 68 DENV. U. L. REV. 127 (1991).   
 3. See generally Thomas A. Hemphill, The Biotechnology Sector and U.S. Gene 
Patents: Legal Challenges to Intellectual Property Rights and the Impact on Basic 
Research and Development, 39 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 815 (2012).  
 4. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012) [hereinafter Mayo]. 
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decision considered confusing by some and dangerously over-
reaching by others.5  For over a century, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the natural phenomenon doctrine to be an implied 
exception to subject-matter eligibility under § 101, which defines the 
categories of innovations that may be eligible for patent protection.6  
The natural phenomenon doctrine excludes laws of nature, products 
of nature and abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter.7
This term, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.—concerning the 
patent-eligibility of genes associated with breast and ovarian cancer 
risk
   
8—which the Court had previously remanded to the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Mayo.9  At 
issue in both Myriad and Mayo was the validity of certain 
biotechnology patent claims that closely resembled abstract 
principles, laws of nature, or natural phenomena.  After the Federal 
Circuit held that Mayo, a case about process patents, did not provide 
the controlling law for the gene patents at issue in Myriad, the 
Supreme Court granted cert on the question of whether genes are 
patentable subject matter.10  In a unanimous decision, the Court 
found that isolated genomic DNA (gDNA) constitutes patent-
ineligible natural phenomena, whereas complementary DNA 
(cDNA)11
 5. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42815, MAYO V. 
PROMETHEUS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND PERSONALIZED 
MEDICINE (2012); see also Elizabeth J. Haanes & Jaume M. Cànaves, Stealing Fire: A 
Retrospective Survey of Biotech Patent Claims in the Wake of Mayo v. Prometheus, 
30 NATURE BIOTECH. 758 (2012).   
 is patent-eligible because it is different from naturally 
occurring DNA.  The Court, however, did not provide any guidance 
on the implications of the invalidated claims on isolated gDNA for 
claims on processes involving isolated gDNA.  The extent to which § 
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
 7. “Natural phenomenon doctrine” is used in this paper to refer to the triad of 
patentable subject matter exceptions (products of nature, laws of nature and abstract 
ideas). 
 8. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
[hereinafter Myriad]. 
 9. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(2012). 
 10. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v USPTO, rev’d sub nom Myriad, 689 F. 3d 
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 
11-725), rev’d in part, granted in part, remanded, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 11. An essential tool of the biotech industry, cDNA (shorthand for 
complementary DNA) is a replica of real DNA with none of the introns but all of the 
exons that are normally found in naturally occurring DNA.  The absence of introns, 
which can be thought of as structural noise, allows scientists to efficiently analyze 
only the relevant parts of the DNA.   
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101 jurisprudence regarding biotech patent claims on processes 
extends to biotech patent claims on compositions of matter —which, 
as cells and compounds, are themselves “essentially bags of chemical 
processes”12
Part I of this paper will introduce early legal developments 
concerning biomedical process patents in order to examine the 
rationales for distinct doctrinal approaches to three different kinds of 
biomedical processes.  This section will explain how, characterized by 
varying degrees of overlap with compositions of matter, certain kinds 
of biomedical processes, including biotech processes, were excluded 
from early attempts to address concerns about monopolies on 
medical knowledge.  After describing the entangled nature of process 
and product patents in biotechnology, Part II turns to an analysis of 
the evolution of judicial and statutory standards that reflected this 
entanglement of biotech patent claims.  Part III follows with a review 
of how the Federal Circuit attempted to address some of these issues 
by creating and altering analytical frameworks tailored to new kinds 
of biomedical processes.  In contrast, this section then traces the 
Supreme Court’s stronger reliance on patent eligibility limitations to 
assess the rationale of the natural phenomenon doctrine for 
addressing the intertwined nature of biotech process and product 
patents.  Part IV then considers the relevance of the natural 
phenomenon doctrine in assessing the implications of Mayo and 
Myriad for biotech process patents, arguing that subject-matter 
eligibility of claims on genes and other diagnostic biotechnology 
should properly account for overlapping scopes of preemption 
between associated process and composition of matter claims in this 
realm.  This paper concludes that due to the natural phenomenon 
doctrine’s implicit purpose—that the preemptive scope of a 
diagnostic biotech patent be limited to the inventive use of that 
product—the doctrine is of limited usefulness at the litigation stage; 
however, the rationale underlying the doctrine, and the importance 
of the doctrine in limiting monopolies on scientific knowledge, may 
—is usefully informed by an analysis of the unique 
trajectories that process patent law has followed in the Federal Circuit 
and Supreme Court.  To this end, it is relevant to understand how 
statutory and judicial patentability categories for processes have 
developed over time, how flexible their contours have been, as well as 
when and to what extent they may be subjected to a doctrine of 
ambiguous scope and relevance. 
 12. Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 
568 (2006).  
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still be pursued through other legal means. 
I. BIOMEDICAL PROCESS PATENTS AND THE SPECIAL CASE OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
A. Statutory And Judicial Foundations 
For most of the twentieth century, new and useful biomedical 
process patents were valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and enforceable 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a-b).  Patent-eligible subject matter is defined 
by § 101 of the U.S. Patent Act, and includes “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof.”13  Notwithstanding this clear 
statutory allowance for biomedical process patents, as early as 1862, a 
patent on using ether as surgical anesthesia was struck down for lack 
of novelty and obviousness in Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary.14  
Ex parte Brinkerhoff subsequently expanded on the Morton 
rationale, holding that “methods or modes of treatment of physicians 
of certain diseases are not patentable” because granting patents for 
treatment methods would inappropriately lead the public to believe 
that a particular method would always produce the expected result.15  
As a result, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
blocked patents on most “medical methods and modes of treatment” 
until 1954.16  This changed when Brinkerhoff was overruled by Ex 
parte Scherer on account of medical methods satisfying the subject-
matter eligibility criteria of a “useful process” of 35 U.S.C. § 101.17  
However, as Noonan highlights, “[t]he Patent Office still suspiciously 
scrutinized such patent applications, and required extra data of 
efficacy in most cases.”18  Following Scherer, though, countless 
patents were issued on biomedical procedures, many of which are 
closely related to natural laws and phenomena.19
Biomedical process patents became increasingly controversial in 
the late twentieth century as infringement lawsuits threatened 
physicians’ ability to provide quality medical care.  For instance, a 
  
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 14. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 883 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862). 
 15. Ex parte Brinkerhoff, 1883 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 349, republished in New 
Decisions, 27 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 797 (1945). 
 16. Asher Hodes, Diagnosing Patentable Subject Matter, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
225, 229 (2011). 
 17. Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107, 1954 WL 5537 (B.P.A.I. July 23,1954) 
(concerning a patent on a method of using a pressure jet to inject medicine).  
 18. William J. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 654 (1995). 
 19. Id. at 658-60. 
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patent on a diagnostic method for Down’s syndrome attracted 
widespread opposition after its owner asserted the patent against 
medical providers throughout the 1990s.20  Around the same time, 
the medical profession’s vocal opposition to infringement lawsuits 
against ophthalmologists who performed medically necessary 
surgeries brought to light certain undesirable consequences of 
monopolies on medical processes.21  In Pallin v. Singer (1995), Dr. 
Pallin, who tried to charge licensing fees for each use of his patented 
process for cataract surgery, sued Dr. Singer for numerous counts of 
infringement.22  In response, the American Academy of 
Ophthalmology expressed apprehension about “the frightening 
potential of having to pay a royalty every time a patient’s temperature 
was taken, if such a procedure was patented.”23  In an unpublished 
consent order, the District of Vermont invalidated some of the claims 
of Dr. Pallin’s patent and enjoined it from being enforced.24  The 
American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Society of 
Cataract and Refractive Surgery subsequently issued statements 
publicly denouncing the patenting of medical and surgical 
procedures, bringing the issue to the attention of Congress;25 their 
sentiments have generally been echoed by other professional medical 
societies.26
 20. Hodes, supra note 
  Some characterized medical process patents as “an 
unethical interference with patient care, a disruption of the medical 
tradition of freely sharing advances with colleagues, and an 
16, at 230.  
 21. See generally Robert Gunderman & John Hammond, “Under the Knife” – 
Patenting Surgical Procedures, THE ROCHESTER ENG’R 10 (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.patenteducation.com/images/200902_Limited_Monopoly_-
_Patenting_Surgical_Procedures.pdf. 
 22. Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).  
 23. Noonan, supra note 18, at 651 (citing Doctors’ Group Opposes Medical 
Method Patents, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1994, A14). 
 24. Pallin v. Singer, 1996 WL 274407, *1. 
 25. Gunderman & Hammond, supra note 21, at 10.  
 26. The WMA explains that patents are not necessary to incentivize innovation in 
medical procedures and that they can lead to higher costs of care, reduced 
availability of physicians licensed to provide certain procedures, and physician 
uncertainty about whether or not a particular procedure is patented. WMA 
Statement on Patenting Medical Procedures, Adopted by the 51st World Medical 
Assembly, Tel Aviv, Israel, Oct. 1999 and amended by the 60th WMA General 
Assembly, New Delhi, India (Oct. 2009). The AMA ethics code also states that “[t]he 
use of patents, trade secrets, confidentiality agreements, or other means to limit the 
availability of medical procedures places significant limitation on the dissemination 
of medical knowledge, and is therefore unethical.” AM. MED. ASS’N, Opinion 9.095 – 
The Use of Patents and Other Means to Limit Availability of Medical Procedures, in 








      10/28/2013   10:59:23
34033_amp 5-1  Sheet No. 25 Side A      10/28/2013   10:59:23
C M
Y K
BENEDICT_MACROFINAL10-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013 2:38 PM
2013] NATURE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 43 
unwelcome expense in a cost conscious modern medical 
environment.”27
In response to this public outcry, two new laws were proposed in 
1995: H.R. 11272, the Medical Procedures Innovation and 
Affordability Act, which would limit the use of USPTO funds available 
to issue process patents; and S.1334, which would amend 35 U.S.C. § 
271 to exempt medical practitioners from patent infringement 
liability.
 
28  The proponents of these bills pointed out that “many 
countries exclude therapeutic and diagnostic methods from patent 
protection and that the United States should follow their lead and 
‘harmonize’ [its] law with theirs.”29  Opponents, however, successfully 
blocked the bills, citing concerns over adverse effects on research and 
development in the burgeoning biotech and diagnostic industries.30
B. Three Different Kinds of Biomedical Process Patents 
   
In understanding this debate, it is useful to consider the varying 
degrees of association with patentable objects exhibited by three 
general categories of patentable biomedical processes: (1) “pure” 
processes, which include diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
procedures not involving a patented medical product; (2) techniques 
that are used to isolate or create potentially patentable medical 
products like DNA; and (3) applications and uses of medical 
products and compositions of matter, which include “new use” 
claims.31  The first of these categories, which does not involve 
patentable objects, falls primarily within the domain of clinical 
innovation.  With the exception of a handful of non-essential 
specialties which subsist primarily based on private payment—and, in 
the absence of demand-generating insurance contracts, have stronger 
incentives for establishing monopolies over their elective services—
the incentive rationale for “pure” process patents in the clinical 
setting is weak as balanced against ethical considerations.  The World 
Medical Association (WMA) has explained that physicians already 
have professional obligations and rewards for “attaining and 
perfecting manual and intellectual skills.”32
 27. Noonan, supra note 
  Moreover, pure process 
18, at 651-52. 
 28. Gunderman & Hammond, supra note 21, at 10.  
 29. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Notice of Hearings and Request for 
Comments on Issues Relating to Patents Protection for Therapeutic and Diagnostic 
Methods, 61 Fed. Reg. 10320 (Mar. 13, 1996). 
 30. Gunderman & Hammond, supra note 21, at 10. 
 31. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical-Process Patents – 
Monopolizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEW. ENGL. J. MED. 2036 (2006). 
 32. World Medical Ass’n, WMA Statement on Patenting Medical Procedures (as 
34033_am
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patents present unique enforcement challenges because their 
infringement—which is transitory (based on discrete acts) as opposed 
to fixed (in a physical embodiment)—may be difficult to detect.   
At the other end of the spectrum lies the third category of 
biomedical processes, which directly rely on products and 
compositions of matter.  Therefore, these processes primarily 
implicate commercial innovation requiring substantial non-clinical 
human and capital investment.  Infringement suits in this realm focus 
on the infringing use of both patented and off-patent products.33  
Notably, because these processes usually involve manufactured goods, 
their licensing fees can more readily be built into the product 
prices.34
Somewhere along the middle of the spectrum these distinctions 
become less apparent, particularly when the patentability of 
associated products and compositions of matter is uncertain. This 
uncertainty characterizes the second category of processes, which 
predominantly includes processes directed at the patentable 
manipulation, extraction, or imitation of biological materials. 
Product claims directed at biological compounds that are associated 
with measurement and information-related process claims cannot be 
seamlessly incorporated into licensing fees, because the biological 
materials involved are merely extracted from the body.  At the same 
time, while biotech innovations require large investments, they 
receive substantial public funding
   
35 and are often developed with 
significant academic contributions.36
amended in 2009) http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/m30/.  
   
 33. E.g., Synvasive Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 425. F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 
2006) (surgical saw blades); Transonic Sys., Inc. v. Non-Invasive Med. Tech. Corp., 75 
F. App’x 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (blood-flow measurement machine); Medtronic 
Xomed, Inc. v. Gyrus ENT LLC, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1306-8 (M.D. Fla. 2006) 
(apparatus used in the removal of noxious tissue).  Many other examples involve 
technologies used in eye surgeries.  E.g., Advanced Med. Optics, Inc. v. Alcon Inc., 
361 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (D. Del. 2005); Koepnick Med. & Educ. Research Found., 
L.L.C. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 162 F. App’x 967 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied (Jan. 25, 
2006). 
 34. “If a drug or device has been patented, the licensing fee is incorporated into 
the cost of the drug or device. Accordingly, the physician does not have to worry 
about inadvertently infringing a drug or device patent, and physicians therefore are 
not discouraged from using drugs or devices by legal uncertainty about patent 
infringement.” AMA, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in the 
Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 341, 345 (1998).  
 35. Between 2003 and 2006, “the NIH funded $4.2 – 4.9 billion of genetics 
research,” which makes genetics research “the sixth or seventh most funded research 
area.” Jennifer Reineke Pohlhaus and Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Genomics Research: 
World Survey of Public Funding, 9 BMC GENOMICS 472, 480 (2008). 
 36. See generally Lori Pressman, et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by Large 
U.S. Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31 (2006).   
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The differences between the three categories of biomedical process 
patents reveal limiting factors that might support differentiated 
degrees of patent protection.  The three categories of patentable 
biomedical processes are in large part defined by their relationship to 
potentially patentable products.  While strong patent protections 
appear most warranted for the third category of biomedical 
processes, they appear least warranted for the first category.  The 
second category, covering most biotechnology, might be thought of 
as falling somewhere in the middle, especially considering the 
remaining uncertainties about the validity of process claims related to 
isolated gDNA.   
C. The Limited Physician’s Immunity Statute 
In the aftermath of the Pallin case, the differences among 
biomedical process categories resulted in a brief Congressional 
stalemate that was broken in 1996 with a narrower third bill.  The 
Physician’s Immunity Statute effectively carved out a narrow 
immunity for physicians’ infringement of pure process patents while 
preserving the subject-matter eligibility and infringement liability of 
all types of biomedical process patents.  To address concerns that 
patents would obstruct the provision of medical care, 
35 U.S.C. § 287—which establishes the conditions for liability for 
patent infringement—was amended to prevent patent owners from 
enforcing medical or surgical procedure patents against medical 
practitioners.37  The amendment, however, § 287(c) (“Limitation on 
damages and other remedies; marking and notice”), excludes from 
its immunity in the infringement of 1) patented products, 2) 
patented uses of compositions of matter, and 3) biotech patents.38
Several limitations of this amendment, which reflect some of the 
aforementioned differences between process categories, are worth 
highlighting.  To address concerns about protecting research and 
development investments in the growing biotech industry, “medical 
activity” was explicitly defined to exclude from immunity biotech 
processes alongside processes involving patented products, thereby 




While the Physician’s Immunity Statute narrowly addressed some 
of the unique characteristics of pure process patents that justify 
   
 37. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Surgical 
Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789, 794-95 (1996). 
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).  
 39. Id. at 797-98.   
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weaker enforcement rights, it was not calibrated to reflect similar 
characteristics of the second and third categories of biomedical 
process patents.  First, the product and composition of matter claims 
associated with certain biotech processes may not be patent eligible, 
rendering these biotech processes more similar to pure processes.  
Second, rents for biotech processes are not easily tied to objects that 
can be sold and therefore defy traditional means of market 
enforcement.40  Several attempts to address these policy gaps through 
legislation have failed to garner the necessary political support.41  For 
instance, the unsuccessful Genetic Research and Diagnostic 
Accessibility Act attempted to carve out physicians’ infringement 
liability for patented biotech processes, because “[e]xempting pure 
process patents and biotechnology process patents from 
infringement liability for physicians would cover correlations and 
diagnostic and treatment methods that form the basis for 
personalized medical care, an integral component to better and 
more effective patient care.”42
II. PRODUCT AND PROCESS ENTANGLEMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
  The following sections will further 
develop the issues surrounding the doctrinal entanglement of 
biotech process and composition of matter claims and how their 
implications for biomedical preemption might otherwise be 
addressed.  
A. The Dual Nature of Biotech Patents 
Although it was repealed by the America Invents Act of 2011, 35 
U.S.C. § 103(b) once provided the lone statutory definition of a 
biotechnology process with respect to patents.43
 40. Moreover, the definition of medical provider is hazier in the realm of 
biotechnology: because biotech processes involve both clinical and commercial 
inputs, they are often performed by specialized biotechnology companies that work 
with and serve medical providers. Therapeutic and surgical procedures, on the other 
hand, more often necessitate simpler mechanical tools, compounds and implements, 
and are therefore performed by medical practitioners in the traditional sense.   
  As set forth in a 1995 
amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 103, a biotechnology process was defined 
to include genetic alteration of organisms to express exogenous 
 41. E.g., Animal and Gene Patent Moratorium Bill, S. 387, 103d Cong. (1993); 
The Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002, H.R. 3966, 107th 
Cong. (2002); The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 
3967, 107th Cong. (2002).  
 42. J. Befeler, Seeking a Better Prescription for Physicians: Patent Eligibility for 
Diagnostic Methods in a Post-Bilski and Prometheus Era, 35 SETON HALL LEG. J. 484, 
514 (2012). 
 43. § 103 was rendered largely obsolete by In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
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nucleotide sequences, manipulate the expression of endogenous 
nucleotide sequences, and express non-naturally occurring 
physiological characteristics; cell fusion to produce cell lines 
expressing specific proteins; and methods of using products created 
through biotechnology processes.44  When set forth as part of the 
Biotechnology Process Patent Act, this definition highlighted a legal 
recognition that innovation in biotech processes is often driven by 
discoveries concerning compositions of matter, which may themselves 
be claimed as processes.45  The critical consequence of this is the 
recognition that biotech processes and compositions of matter may 
overlap in the scope of their preemption of the use of natural laws 
and natural phenomena.46  As Burk explains, innovation in the 
biotech industry relies on “the character of molecules as channels for 
informational transfer processes,” and biotech patents are thus 
“characterized as much by their processes as by their material make-
up.”47  Indeed, as Burk elaborates, this aspect of biotechnology may 
be of greater consequence than in other realms, because biological 
materials are “generally valued precisely because of their internal 
process activity, which in turn typically constitutes the patentable 
point of novelty.”48  Thus, from an early stage, modern biotechnology 
has relied heavily on process patents because the products of most 
biotech processes—proteins—are usually not patentable.  Process 
claims are thus often used to indirectly protect otherwise un-
patentable biotech products.49
 44. Biotechnology Process Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 104-3 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 
103(b) (2006) (repealed 2011)). 
   
 45. For instance, § 103(B), “cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that 
expresses a specific protein, such as a monoclonal antibody,” allows naturally 
occurring products to be indirectly protected vis-à-vis the processes that yield them, 
and § 103(C), “a method of using a product produced by a process defined by 
subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B),” allows 
naturally occurring products to be indirectly protected vis-à-vis their use.  Defining 
biotechnology in this way ensures that unpatentable biotech products can 
nevertheless be indirectly protected through their associated processes. 
 46. As early as 1912, the Second Circuit recognized novelty in the invention of 
purified biological materials might be tied to the discovery and manipulation of a law 
of nature.  In Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., the patentability of purified 
adrenaline was upheld in what is now considered a foundational case in 
biotechnology patent law.  Even at this early stage in the development of the biotech 
industry, the Second Circuit noted that “[i]t was important, if possible, to ascertain 
what it was in these glands which possessed these physiological properties, whether it 
was a ‘principle’ or a ‘condition,’ and if it were a ‘principle’ to isolate it from its 
environment with other principles.”  Parke-Davis & Co. v. H K Mulford & Co., 196 F. 
496, 497 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 47. Burk, supra note 12, at 563, 568.  
 48. Id. at 568.  
 49. Kristin Connarn, Section 103(b): Obviously Unnecessary? 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 
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Diagnostic biotech processes doubly defy traditional doctrinal 
boundaries: process and composition of matter claims become highly 
dependent on each other as channels of information, and both 
process and composition of matter claims become increasingly 
inseparable from their natural underpinnings.  Because the purpose 
of a diagnostic biotech process is to produce information about the 
body, diagnostic processes are largely based on natural laws.  These 
processes entail measurement procedures (e.g., calculations, 
correlations, comparisons) that involve biological materials, which 
may in turn be valuable primarily for the processes they host.  As a 
result, diagnostic biotech processes and their associated products 
similarly serve to preempt the use of biological information (e.g., a 
genetic sequence or correlation) and the compounds that encompass 
this information (e.g., an isolated gene or expressed protein).  As 
Burk explains, it is not just the embodiment of information but 
information flow that lies at the core of the web of overlapping claims 
to diagnostic processes and compositions of matter: 
[S]ince information is encoded as molecular structure, the 
information is only useful when embodied in such structures, 
which is to say that, ultimately, no one is really interested in 
strings of human-readable letters—they are instead 
interested in what can be done with the structures such 
letters represent. And that in turn means that by necessity 
they must be interested in building physical informational 
structures—the molecules that are the conduit for 
information transfer . . . The configuration of informational 
molecules is based upon the interaction with, and so upon 
the configuration of, precursor molecules. Because such 
molecular structure is the channel by which information is 
conveyed, the interaction of macromolecules is the point of 
interest in biotechnology patenting—and “interactions” 
should fall formally into the category of processes. But 
molecular structure defines the parameters for such a 
process, and structure falls formally into the category of 
products.50
Some commentators have thus raised concerns about the 
preemptive effects of patent thickets, lack of transparency, and 
uncertainty in the realm of diagnostic biotech processes.
 
51
287, 291 (2005).  
  Others 
 50. Id. at 587. 
 51. See generally Isabelle Huys et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic 
Diagnostic Testing, 27 NATURE BIOTECH. 903 (2009) (finding, in an analysis of 22 
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worry about monopolies over vital health information and patent 
holdouts when diagnostic methods are exclusively licensed.52
The interrelated nature of biotech process and composition of 
matter claims has resulted in the legal entanglement of categorically 
distinct biotech patent claims despite the (disputed) precedent of
   
 In 
re Durden,53 in which the Federal Circuit held that “each statutory 
class of claims should be considered independently on its own 
merits.”54
B. Early Jurisprudence Concerning Chemical Processes and 
Compounds 
  In practice, a biotech process claim can never truly be 
separated from the biological materials it implicates, and vice versa.  
Moreover, the fast pace of technological re-definition of what 
constitutes a process, due largely to progress in information 
nanotechnology, has resulted in process patent jurisprudence 
perennially struggling to keep up with the pace of innovation.  At the 
same time, the relatively abstract nature of processes (as compared to 
compositions of matter) has prompted more inquiry into the subject-
matter eligibility of process patents.   
While patent claims on chemical compounds do not usually raise 
doctrinal issues related to the preemption of natural phenomena 
because they do not seek to imitate biology, cases concerning 
chemical compounds illustrate an early pattern of entangling the 
analysis of claims to processes and compositions of matter.  In In re 
Papesch, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) 
stated “a chemical compound and all of its properties are 
inseparable.55
common genetic tests, that the precise scope of claims is often ambiguous). 
  And, as the Federal Circuit explained in In re Dillon, it 
was the long-standing practice of the CCPA to join analyzing 
chemical structures and properties in determining the patentability 
 52. “[T]he Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society 
expressed concern that ‘patenting and exclusive licensing practices might have 
limited the availability and quality of [patented genetic] tests’ . . . [and] that patents 
for genetic tests may lead to ‘hold-outs,’ where ‘a single entity holding critical 
technology may refuse to license or may charge what others regard as unfair or 
disproportional fees even though it holds only one technology of many needed for a 
clinically useful test.’”  Margaret Kubick, An Uncertain Future: The Impact of 
Medical Process and Diagnostic Method Patents on Healthcare in the United States, 
9 NW. J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 280, 295 (2010); see also Robert Cook-Deegan & C. 
Heaney, Gene Patents and Licensing: Case Studies Prepared for the Secretary’s 
Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, 12 GENETIC MED. S1 (2010). 
 53. See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (1995) (citing In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 
688, 695 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 54. In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 55. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (CCPA 1963).  
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of chemical compounds.56
In 1966, the Supreme Court considered the relationship between 
chemical processes and their output.  In Brenner v. Manson, the 
Court was asked to review the rejection of a chemical process patent 
with an output of undefined utility.  The Court upheld the rejection, 
explaining “a process patent in the chemical field, which has not 
been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a 
monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly 
commanded by the statute.”
  
57  Due to the Court’s conclusion that a 
process lacked utility if its end product lacked the requisite utility, 
commentators noted that “this reasoning fail[ed] to maintain the 
conceptual separation of invention between product and process.”58  
However, this apparent conflation was not unintentional.  On the 
contrary, the Court recognized a strong rationale for consistency in 
the patent rules applying equally to process and product patents 
when they cover essentially the same subject matter, holding that a 
process could not be patented if what it produced was not 
patentable.59
Similarly, in Application of Lunsford, the CCPA stated: “[W]e have 
frequently found novel chemical processes producing the same 
product, but in unexpectedly higher yields, to be patentable by 
reason of that yield, a ‘matter of degree.’ Should not chemical 
products, also displaying an unexpectedly higher degree of 
effectiveness, be treated in like manner?”
  Finding itself in a position where the appropriate rule 
governing patentability was directed at products rather than 
processes, the Court nevertheless sought guidance in the spirit of the 
law.   
60  The Federal Circuit later 
attempted to address this and analogous questions in a string of cases 
concerning naturally occurring compounds,61
 56. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 noting that often in 
 57. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 58. Burk, supra note 12, at 579. 
 59. “We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although Congress 
intended that no patent be granted on a chemical compound whose sole ‘utility’ 
consists of its potential role as an object of use-testing, a different set of rules was 
meant to apply to the process which yielded the unpatentable product. That 
proposition seems to us little more than an attempt to evade the impact of the rules, 
which concededly govern patentability of the product itself.” Brenner, 383 U.S. at 
535.  
 60. In re Lunsford, 357 F.2d 380, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
 61. In considering the patentability of a chemical process in In re Durden, the 
Federal Circuit stated that “a new process may still be obvious, even when considered 
‘as a whole,’ notwithstanding the specific starting material or resulting product, or 
both, is not to be found in the prior art.” In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1410 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). In considering the patentability of a chemical product in In re 
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such cases, “the compounds and their use are but different aspects of, 
or ways of looking at, the same invention and consequently that 
invention is capable of being claimed both as new compounds or as a 
new method or process.”62  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit was clear 
that these cases did not produce rigid rules, but rather per se rules 
that were highly context-dependent.63
C. Issues Raised by Statutory Amendments in the Late Twentieth 
Century  
   
In 1988, the Process Patent Amendment Act (PPAA) further 
narrowed the divide between process and product patents by 
assigning process patent holders the right to exclude imported 
products made by their patented process outside the U.S.64  The 
PPAA prompted a string of lawsuits in which biotech process patent 
holders sued foreign entities for having used their patented processes 
outside of the U.S. to manufacture and import to the U.S. the 
products of these processes.65  At the core of these cases was the 
question of how biotech products—which, as cells and compounds, 
were “essentially bags of chemical processes”—should be interpreted 
under the PPAA.66  The Federal Circuit ultimately adhered to a broad 
definition of process, allowing the PPAA to cover those outputs that 
were twice removed from the original process.67  On the other hand, 
when faced with the corresponding question of whether the PPAA 
protected against the importation of “purely informational ‘products” 
developed outside the U.S. using a patented process, the Federal 
Circuit adhered to a narrow definition of product as a 
“manufacture.”68
Pleuddemann, the Federal Circuit explained that “[w]hen a new and useful 
compound or group of compounds is invented or discovered having a particular use 
it is often the case that what is really a single invention may be viewed legally as 
having three or more different aspects permitting it to be claimed in different ways, 
for example: (1) the compounds themselves; (2) the method or process of making 
the compounds; and (3) the method or process of using the compounds for their 
intended purpose. 910 F.2d 823, 825-26 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 
 62. Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d at 827.  
 63. Connarn, supra note 49, at 296. 
 64. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 
9001-07, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563-67 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 287 
(1988)).  
 65. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 
1990); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 66. Burk, supra note 12, at 573. 
 67. See, e.g., Bio-Tech., 80 F.3d at 1556 (finding that human growth hormone 
(hGH) was a product covered by patented process used to make the plasmids 
necessary for the production of the hGH). 
 68. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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In his pioneering assessment of the problem of biotechnologies as 
channels of information that straddle the boundaries between 
process and composition of matter patents, Burk traces how the 
muddled biotech process-product distinction replete in these 
offshore infringement cases trickled into domestic infringement cases 
concerning obviousness and utility.69 Early obviousness cases 
concerning renovated processes yielded a seemingly straightforward 
outcome: processes were generally deemed un-patentable if the end 
product was patentable but the starting material was not, whereas 
processes were generally deemed patentable if the end product was 
not patentable but the starting material was.70  While the outcomes of 
these cases could be more or less squared with each other, they 
inconsistently bifurcated the novelty and non-obviousness inquiries 
when dealing with comparable combinations of process and product 
claims.71  In any case, they did not offer much clarity for biotech 
claims that were characterized by the ambiguous informational 
correspondence between DNA, amino acid sequences, and the 
proteins they encode.72
In 1995, the Biotechnology Process Patent Act (BPPA) amended 35 
U.S.C. § 103 in an attempt to provide some certainty concerning how 
to navigate the boundary-defying interactions between biotech 
process and product claims.
   
73  The amendment established that non-
obvious biotech processes, regardless of other precedent concerning 
subject-matter eligibility, are patentable if they produce a non-
obvious product subject to “timely election.”74  Shortly after passage 
of the BPPA, though, the Federal Circuit issued several opinions that 
ultimately rendered the amendment obsolete by upholding the 
primacy of per se rules for biotech patents, which offered far more 
flexibility for the various degrees of association between processes 
and compositions of matter.75
 69. See generally Burk, supra note 
  By carving out a narrow solution, the 
BPPA failed to foresee the various iterations of associated product 
and process claims which could be exposed to additional grounds for 
12. 
 70. Id. at 573. 
 71. Id. at 574. 
 72. In In re Bell, the Federal Circuit reversed the PTO’s determination that 
“amino acid sequence of a protein in conjunction with a reference indicating a 
general method of cloning renders the gene prima facie obvious.” See In re Bell, 991 
F.2d 781, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 73. Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 351, 351 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006, repealed 2011)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Connarn, supra note 49 at 296 (citing In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565 (1995); In 
re Brouwer, 77 F.3d 422 (1996); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (1995)). 
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invalidity challenges if they relied solely on § 103(b).76 Connarn 
points out that the “PTO even published a notice stating that the use 
of § 103(b) should be rare,” and that § 103(b) “has never been 
mentioned in any judicial or administrative decisions.”77  The BPPA 
was ultimately repealed in 2011 with the America Invents Act,78
III. SUBJECT-MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND THE NATURAL PHENOMENON 
DOCTRINE 
 but its 
legacy, as an attempt to simplify the increasingly confusing realm of 
biotech process patents, survives as an undercurrent to today’s 
uncertainties regarding the scope of patentable subject matter 
limitations for the quickly evolving biotech industry. 
A. The Federal Circuit’s approach to subject-matter eligibility 
The Federal Circuit’s chemical compound cases suggested that 
process patents interlaced with separately patentable products defy 
doctrinal clarity and therefore require context-specific analysis.  In 
this spirit, when faced with new technologies that did not fit neatly 
into process patent rules, the CCPA and Federal Circuit developed 
and refined analytical approaches to evaluate the subject-matter 
eligibility of process claims.  Particularly short-lived tests included the 
technological arts test (which stated that methods—particularly 
business methods—were patentable to the extent that they claimed 
uses of computers or other electronic devices)79 and the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test (which stated that a mathematical algorithm was 
patentable if limited by physical elements or process steps as long as 
these elements or steps amounted to more than post-solution 
activity).80  However a utility test introduced by the Federal Circuit in 
1998 substantially broadened the patentability standards for 
processes.81  As Ghosh documents, by 2006, “patents on diagnostic 
processes and isolated natural products were being routinely 
granted.”82
 76. Id. at 299. 
  This facilitated a proliferation of medical process patents 
and infringement lawsuits, which gradually helped refine the 
 77. Id. at 301. 
 78. America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29 (2011). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  
 80. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 81. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998).  
 82. Samantak Ghosh, Prometheus and the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine: Let’s 
Not Lose Sight of the Forest for the Trees, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 330, 
336  (2012). 
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contours of process patentability standards, especially as related to 
biotechnology.   
Faced with validity challenges to new technologies, the Federal 
Circuit—rather than considering the subject-matter eligibility of 
biotech process and product claims resembling natural 
phenomena—adapted its analytical tests to fit the changing contours 
of the biotech patents,.  One of the key precedent-setting challenges 
to biotech patents arose in 2005 in a case concerning the 
patentability of expressed sequence tags (ESTs), short cDNA 
transcripts for identifying nucleic acid sequences in maize genes.  In 
In re Fisher, the Federal Circuit held that a “laundry list” of research 
applications could not impart sufficient § 101 utility on the ESTs in 
the absence of any indication of “the precise structure or function of 
either the genes or the proteins encoded for by those [maize] 
genes.”83  Even though Fisher concerned a composition of matter, 
the Federal Circuit applied Brenner, which dealt with a process 
patent, and concluded that the listed research processes did not 
fulfill a requirement of specific utility because the utility of their 
outputs was unclear.84  In In re Kubin, the Federal Circuit—again 
without addressing § 101 subject-matter eligibility—usefully 
disentangled some confusion concerning the impact of prior art 
processes on genetic sequence claims.85  Without considering 
whether or not Kubin’s application for a patent on an isolated DNA 
sequence constituted a product of nature, the court invalidated the 
patent as obvious, explaining that “the claimed invention was 
reasonably expected in light of the prior art and ‘obvious to try.’”86
The Federal Circuit alluded to a § 101 eligibility issue in King 
Pharmaceuticals v. Eon Labs, in which it held that an “otherwise 
anticipated” diagnostic claim does not become patentable simply 
“because it includes a step of ‘informing’ someone about the 
   
 83. “The ‘643 application generally discloses that the five claimed ESTs may be 
used in a variety of ways, including: (1) serving as a molecular marker for mapping 
the entire maize genome, which consists of ten chromosomes that collectively 
encompass roughly 50,000 genes; (2) measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue 
sample via microarray technology to provide information about gene expression; (3) 
providing a source for primers for use in the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) 
process to enable rapid and inexpensive duplication of specific genes; (4) identifying 
the presence or absence of a polymorphism; (5) isolating promoters via chromosome 
walking; (6) controlling protein expression; and (7) locating genetic molecules of 
other plants and organisms.” In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  
 84. Id. at 1370 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966)).   
 85. 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 86. Id. at 1361 (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F. 2d 894, 904 (1988)). 
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existence of an inherent property of that method.”87  While noting 
that such a claim may constitute an abstract idea, the court stated that 
“[t]he present case, however, does not present the proper vehicle for 
determining whether claims covering medical treatment methods are 
eligible for patenting under § 101 because even if claim 21 recites 
patent eligible subject matter, that subject matter is anticipated for 
the reasons discussed below.”88  In one sense, King’s reasoning was 
reminiscent of Ex parte Brinkeroff’s distaste for patenting modes of 
informing patients of a possible outcome, although it did not go so 
far as to prohibit claims including an “informing” step, merely 
holding that such a step could not itself impart patentability.89
B. Evolution of the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine in The Supreme 
Court 
  Again, 
though, the Federal Circuit’s flexibility in tailoring its analysis to the 
technology in question precluded the need for broader inquiry into 
the subject-matter eligibility of these overlapping process and 
product claims.  
Unlike the patent-entrenched Federal Circuit, which has to 
continuously adapt and respond to the demands of changing 
technologies, the Supreme Court has a long history of assessing new 
process patent questions through the theoretical lens of § 101 
subject-matter eligibility.  When confronted with challenges to 
patents in emerging fields of technology, the Court has far more 
often invoked the natural phenomenon doctrine, and it has done so 
with little regard for doctrinal distinctions between processes and 
products.  Derived from English common law,90 the natural 
phenomenon doctrine has been reaffirmed several times by the 
Court as necessary to avoid unwarranted preemption of research and 
innovation resulting from the monopolization of basic scientific tools, 
namely, laws of nature, products of nature, and abstract ideas.91
In the earliest of these cases, O’Reilly v. Morse, a patent on the 
telegraph was upheld even though it claimed the natural 
phenomenon of using electromagnetism as a motive power, because 
this was “combined with, and passed through, and operate[d] upon, 
certain complicated and delicate machinery, adjusted and arranged 
 
 87. King Pharms. v. Eon Labs, 616 F.3d 1267, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1278-79.  
 90. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). 
 91. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3238-39, 3253 (2010). 
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upon philosophical principles, and prepared by the highest 
mechanical skill.”92  Similarly, in Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court upheld 
the patentability of the discovery that lead would reunite perfectly 
after separation under certain conditions, explaining that “[t]he 
principle may be the new and valuable discovery, but the practical 
application of it to some useful purpose is the test of its value,” and 
thus, inventiveness.93  In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio 
Corp. of America, the Court relied on the natural phenomenon 
doctrine to narrowly construe a patent claim, limiting its scope to its 
specific inventive application of a scientific formula for wavelength 
positioning in antennae.94
In 1948 the Supreme Court had the occasion to provide a more 
explicit basis for the natural phenomenon doctrine.  In Funk Bros. 
Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, the Court invalidated a patent claim on a 
mixed culture of bacterial strains chosen for their ability to convert 
environmental nitrogen into a usable form without adversely 
affecting the effectiveness of the mixture’s other strains of bacteria.
  While these cases help illustrate the 
Court’s early precedent concerning the natural phenomenon 
doctrine, they stopped short of explaining its underlying rationale, 
because it was not ultimately found to control the questions at bar. 
95  
While the patent claims in Funk Bros. concerned a composition of 
matter, they effectively preempted the process of using several 
complementary bacterial strains to promote the useful conversion of 
nitrogen.  In its decision, the Court explained that “[t]he qualities of 
these bacteria, like . . . the qualities of metals, are part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws 
of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none,” and that 
their combination was nothing more than a basic application in the 
form of packaging.96
 92. 56 U.S. 62, 117 (1853). 
  Even though the new combination of bacterial 
strains held significant advantages over the individual strains found in 
nature, the constituent parts of the invention ultimately did little 
more than “serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite 
 93. 63 U.S. 132, 137 (1859). 
 94. “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not 
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge 
of scientific truth may be. But . . . [w]e assume, without deciding the point, that this 
advance was invention even though it was achieved by the logical application of a 
known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna. But it is apparent that if this 
assumption is correct the invention was a narrow one . . . .” Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. 
v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).  
 95. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 96. Id. at 130. 
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independently of any effort of the patentee.”97
The next few times the Supreme Court invoked the natural 
phenomenon doctrine, it did not hesitate to interchangeably apply 
precedent concerning product claims to process claims, and later on, 
vice versa. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court rejected a patent on an 
algorithm for binary conversion, explaining that “mental processes, 
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work.”
  To some extent, Funk 
Bros. left courts with some flexibility in defining to what extent a 
natural phenomenon’s use would have to be “dependent” on the 
handiwork of the inventor in order to be patentable.  This inquiry 
turns out to be critical for diagnostic biotech processes, which also 
harness natural phenomena to more efficiently undertake reactions 
that might not be observed as a whole in nature, although each 
constituent part acts as it would in nature when interacting with other 
parts of the process.   
98  The Court cited 
Funk Bros. in support of this rule, acknowledging as an aside that 
although it “dealt there with a ‘product’ claim, while the present case 
deals with a ‘process’ claim . . . the same principle applies.”99  Because 
the algorithm in question had “no substantial practical application 
except in connection with a digital computer,” the Court found that 
upholding its patent “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical 
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm 
itself.”100  The Court likened the claimed process to a law of nature 
and thus invalidated it, albeit stopping short of finding that the 
individual claims themselves merely embodied laws of nature.101
Similarly, in Parker v. Flook, the Court invalidated a patent on a 
method for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion by 
means of a mathematical algorithm.
   
102  Because all the non-formulaic 
elements of the patent claims were not novel, the patentability 
inquiry focused on the application of the independently 
unpatentable formula. The Court explained that Mackay Radio and 
Funk Bros. governed even though those cases concerned product 
patents, thereby “foreclos[ing] a purely literal reading of § 101,”103
 97. Id. at 131. 
 
and emphasizing that “[t]he underlying notion is that a scientific 
 98. 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 99. Id. at 67-68. 
 100. Id. at 71-72. 
 101. Id. at 67.  
 102. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).  
 103. Id. at 589. 
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principle . . . reveals a relationship that has always existed.”104  The 
Court held that “[t]he process itself, not merely the mathematical 
algorithm, must be new and useful”; as a law of nature, the formula 
could only be patented via an inventive application of it.105  
Notwithstanding the novelty of applying the formula to the particular 
process of calculating alarm limit values, the Court found that such 
an application was not sufficiently novel, as its effect on the alarm 
limits was limited to the effect of the equation.  Considering the 
preemptive effect of allowing the patent to stand, the Court 
explained that even though the claims did not “cover every 
conceivable application of the formula,”106 these “post-solution” 
applications could not “transform an unpatentable principle into a 
patentable process.”107  As in Benson, the Court’s interpretation of 
the natural phenomenon doctrine to preclude patentability in this 
case was not self-evident, and it was accompanied by a harsh dissent.  
However, the Court explained that it was wary of unprecedentedly 
expanding the scope of patentable subject matter.108
The Supreme Court retreated somewhat from its approach in 
Flook in Diamond v. Diehr.  Explaining that patentability should be 
assessed as a whole rather than in parts, the Court upheld the 
patentability of a rubber curing process involving a thermodynamic 
equation.
 
109  Surviving a natural phenomenon analysis, the process 
patent was deemed valid because it did not simply apply a natural 
principle to a specific context, wherein “insignificant post-solution 
activity [would] not transform an unpatentable principle into a 
patentable process” (as was the case in Flook); it was also tied to a 
rubber-curing machine, and therefore only sought to “pre-empt the 
use of that equation . . . in conjunction with all of the other steps.”110
 104. Id. at 593 n.15; In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (adding that “[t]his insight . . . is at the 
core of the judicial doctrine by which laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are excluded from patentable subject matter.”). 
  
The outcome in Diehr differed from that in Flook only because the 
anchoring structure itself in Diehr passed the test for novelty, thereby 
limiting the scope of unwarranted preemption.  As Hodes explains, 
“[n]arrowing the scope of the method patent by coupling it to a 
 105. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591.  
 106. Id. at 586. 
 107. Id. at 590. 
 108. Id. at 596 (“It is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in 
light of our prior precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to 
extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.”). 
 109. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 176 (1981).  
 110. Id. at 187, 191-93. 
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specific ‘structure or process’ within the scope of patent-eligible 
subject matter minimized the danger that patents would cover pure 
knowledge of the world and hinder harvesting the fruits of such 
knowledge.”111
In 2006, the Supreme Court granted cert in Laboratory Corp. v. 
Metabolite,
   
112 a case about the patentability of a natural correlation, 
but ultimately dismissed the petition as improvidently granted.113  It is 
speculated that the Court dismissed the petition because the issue of 
patentable subject matter raised on appeal was not properly argued 
in the lower courts.114  The dismissal was somewhat remarkable 
because, by this time, the quickly growing biotech industry was eager 
for certainty regarding the strength of diagnostic process patents.  
Upheld by the Federal Circuit, LabCorp concerned a patented 
process of diagnosing vitamin deficiencies by measuring 
homocysteine levels in the blood through a correlation with B 
vitamins using any homocysteine-specific testing method.115  
Laboratory Corporation was held liable for inducing infringement by 
encouraging doctors to order tests for measuring homocysteine, and 
it was enjoined from using homocysteine-only tests to detect vitamin 
deficiency.116  In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Laboratory 
Corporation argued that the diagnostic correlations, as laws of 
nature, were not patentable under the natural phenomenon 
doctrine’s exception to § 101.117  In response, Metabolite argued that 
overturning the patentability of correlations between disease states 
and biomarkers could have far-reaching negative effects, including 
the invalidation of all drug patents, as such patents merely discover 
certain chemical interactions in the body.118
 111. Hodes, supra note 
  These concerns, 
however, were likely unfounded; chemical processes and products 
differ significantly from their biochemical counterparts because they 
generally correlate and interact with biology rather than replicate 
and imitate biology.  Three justices dissented to the Court’s dismissal, 
with Justice Breyer rejecting the State Street Bank utility test and 
calling for a weaker machine-or-transformation test (discussed in the 
16, at 227-28.  
 112. 548 U.S. 124 (2006) [hereinafter Labcorp]. 
 113. Id, at 125.  
 114. Hodes, supra note 16, at 230-31.  
 115. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  
 116. Id.  
 117. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, LabCorp, 548 U.S. 124 (No. 04-607). 
 118. Brief for Respondents at 46, LabCorp, 548 U.S. 124 (No. 04-607). 
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following section).119  Justice Breyer explained that the mere 
transformation of a blood sample, which was not the focus of the 
patent’s diagnostic correlation claims, did not render the claims 
subject-matter eligible.120  Notably, he expressed concern about the 
preemptive scope of diagnostic process patents that could serve as 
barriers to physicians’ ability to freely and efficiently exercise their 
best medical judgment, unencumbered by licensing arrangements 
and patent searches that would raise the cost of health care.121  
Importantly, Justice Breyer noted that “[p]atent law seeks to avoid the 
dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid the 
diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can threaten,”122
C. Subject-Matter Eligibility Revisited by The Federal Circuit 
 
emphasizing the relevance of the scope of preemption of scientific 
principles. 
Two years later, with In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit reconsidered 
the dominant test for patent-eligible subject matter in a case 
concerning business methods.  In striking down a patent on a 
business method as an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit held that the 
machine-or-transformation (M-o-T) test was the ultimate test for 
process claim subject-matter eligibility under § 101.123  The M-o-T 
test, derived from nineteenth century common law, deemed 
patentable any process that either involves a patented machine (e.g., 
device, apparatus, or computer) or significantly transforms an article 
from one state to another, and in doing so attempts to distinguish 
monopolies on fundamental principles from monopolies on 
applications of fundamental principles.124  The Supreme Court 
considered the M-o-T test in Bilski v. Kappos, noting that several 
amicus briefs shared a concern that continued reliance on the M-o-T 
test would increase uncertainty, particularly “as to the patentability of 
software, [and] advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.”125
 119. Infra Part III.C.  
  In 
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court upheld the outcome of In re 
 120. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 135-36 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 138.  
 122. Id. at 127.  
 123. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  
 124. See id. at 971-72. 
 125. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (citing Brief for Business Software Alliance 24–25; 
Brief for Biotech. Industry Org. et al. 14–27; Brief for Boston Patent Law Ass’n 8–15; 
Brief for Houston Intellectual Property Law Ass’n 17–22; Brief for Dolby Labs., Inc., 
et al. 9–10). 
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Bilski, but clarified that the M-o-T test was merely one analytical 
approach to subject-matter eligibility that should be understood as “a 
useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining 
whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”126  By 
relegating the M-o-T test to be just one of several considerations, 
Kappos both broadened subject-matter eligibility (by removing the 
strict requirement for a machine or transformation) and narrowed it 
(by establishing that the presence of a machine or transformation was 
no longer sufficient).127  At the same time, Kappos reaffirmed the 
distinction between the subject-matter eligibility threshold (in 
determining whether or not something qualifies as a process), and 
the other statutory requirements of patentability, a distinction that is 
easily muddled when patentability requirements can be calibrated to 
have the same limiting effect as subject-matter eligibility standards.  
Interestingly, Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Kappos intimated that 
the natural phenomenon doctrine might apply beyond exact replicas 
of nature128
While tempering the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the M-o-T test, 
the Supreme Court noted that its opinion should not “be read as 
endorsing the Federal Circuit’s past interpretations of § 101,”
   
129  
Indeed, as the Federal Circuit has dealt with the changing pace of 
technological innovation by creating short-lived tests suitable for 
determining the questions at hand, the Supreme Court has generally 
not adopted these tests as controlling law.  Rather, on several notable 
occasions, it has tempered the role of these tests via the “catch-all” 
natural phenomenon doctrine’s ambiguous but flexible contours for 
fast-changing technology.130
 126. See, e.g., id. 
  The Federal Circuit sorted out some of 
the implications of Kappos for biotechnology with Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, which the Supreme Court 
 127. For an analysis of how the machine-or-transformation test can be usefully 
supplemented by earlier judicial tests, see Jennifer L. Davis, Patent Law – 
Patentability Post-Bilski: No Need to Throw the Baby out with the Bath Water when 
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 421 (2012). 
 128. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3238-39 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, J.J., 
concurring) (“The Court also accepts that we have ‘foreclose[d] a purely literal 
reading of § 101,’ Flook, . . . by holding that claims that are close to ‘laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,’ Diamond v. Diehr, . . . do not count as 
‘processes’ under § 101, even if they can be colloquially described as such.”). 
 129. Id. at 3222 (majority opinion). 
 130. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? 
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. 
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 4-5 (2012), cited in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012). 
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remanded to be reconsidered in light of Kappos.131 Classen 
concerned a patent on a general process for determining ideal 
immunization schedules, which the Federal Circuit had previously 
found failed the M-o-T test.  The Federal Circuit reversed its position 
and upheld the subject-matter eligibility of two claims that were 
“directed to a specific, tangible application”—because they claimed 
“a method of lowering the risk of chronic immune-mediated 
disorder, including the physical step of immunization on the 
determined schedule”—but rejected the patent eligibility of a third 
claim which, in the absence of a physical immunization step, was 
merely an “abstract principle that variation in immunization 
schedules may have consequences for certain diseases.”132
Not surprisingly, the confines of what is considered to be a natural 
phenomenon are inherently hazy.
   
133  Nevertheless, the natural 
phenomenon doctrine can be an important safeguard to functionally 
overlapping patent claims that unreasonably preempt the use of 
natural phenomena, as the jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine 
has developed interchangeably between product and process claims.  
Because the Supreme Court is far less involved in the continuous 
doctrinal recalibration needed to adjust to new technologies, it “has 
used the doctrine to expand and contract the scope of patentability 
in response to the changes in technology and socio-economic 
factors.”134
 131. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F. 3d 1057, 1067 (2011). 
  By reflecting the spirit of the law, patentable subject 
matter rules can be particularly useful for assessing patents covering 
relatively new technologies that may not fit neatly into existing 
analytical frameworks.  If they are well-defined, “[p]atentable subject 
matter boundaries can help to minimize uniformity costs by limiting 
 132. Id. at 1066-67.  Hodes explains that controversy surrounding the possible 
presence of a substantively valid transformation in the claims might have been 
usefully expounded in LabCorp with relevance to the natural phenomenon doctrine:  
“Several commentators have noted that vaccinations transform a patient by 
conferring immunity.  However, the Classen vaccination step is not performed on an 
actual patient to protect him or her from a specific disease.  Instead it is performed 
on a generic research subject.  Indeed, the Classen patent appears to claim merely 
the performance of a controlled experiment in the field of minimizing vaccine-
induced autoimmune reactions.  Thus, the Classen transformation might be judged 
ancillary, insignificant, extra-solution activity.  This centrality standard might serve to 
distinguish processes that produce a direct patient benefit from those that are 
research tools.” Hodes, supra note 16 at 232. 
 133. Ghosh, supra note 82, at 333 (quoting Richard Seth Gipstein, The Isolation 
and Purification Exception to the General Unpatentability of Products of Nature, 4 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 3 (2003)) (“Since the precise foundation of the 
natural phenomenon doctrine ‘remains somewhat ambiguous [it] leaves the limits of 
the doctrine lacking proper delineation’ causing much confusion.”).  
 134. Ghosh, supra note 82, at 332.  
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the diversity of innovations that patent law covers, thus making it 
easier to achieve a more optimal level of protection for a narrower 
range of innovations.”135  Moreover, to the extent that it can serve the 
purpose of avoiding unwarranted preemption, the natural 
phenomenon doctrine substantially reflects the utilitarian theory of 
intellectual property,136 which the Court cited in Kappos while 
considering the constitutionally mandated purpose of the patent 
system.137
Because the Supreme Court has applied the rationale for the 
natural phenomenon doctrine to processes and products alike, it 
appears highly compatible with some of the issues raised by 
diagnostic biotech patents.  Diagnostic biotechnology is still a 
relatively new area characterized by special challenges that arise in 
assessing the extent to which a patentee has manipulated natural 
processes at the core of diagnostic innovations.  In this realm, the 
undeniable relationship between information and biology makes a 
compelling case for reliance on the natural phenomenon doctrine. 
Because biotechnology inevitably defies traditional categories, the 
catch-all nature of the natural phenomenon doctrine renders it 
suitable for pressing subject-matter eligibility questions that remain 
unanswered. 
   
IV. MAYO, MYRIAD AND THE WAY FORWARD  
A. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 
Last year, in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court used the 
natural phenomenon doctrine to bar the subject-matter eligibility of 
natural correlations used in a diagnostic process.  Responding to the 
Federal Circuit’s continued reliance on the M-o-T test in spite of 
Kappos, the Court clarified that the natural phenomenon doctrine 
always trumps the M-o-T test.138
 135. Eisenberg, supra note 
  The Court invalidated Prometheus’s 
patent on a diagnostic method that involved administering 
thiopurines and observing chemical reactions in the body as a basis 
for dosing advice, stating that the patent improperly claimed a 
natural law.  The claimed natural laws could not rise to the level of 
patentable subject matter by being limited to a particular 
130, at 48.   
 136. See, e.g., David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law 
Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1 
(2009).  
 137. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3254 (2010) (citing Id.). 
 138. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 
(2012). 
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technological environment or by “simply appending conventional 
steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”139  Echoing  Flook,140 Justice Breyer 
explained that “a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of 
nature, mathematical formulas and the like . . . serves as a somewhat 
more easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ 
concern,” noting that “the underlying functional concern here is a 
relative one: how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the 
contribution of the inventor.”141  Justice Breyer explained that the 
danger of process patents tying up future innovation becomes acute 
when a patent “forecloses more future invention than the underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.”142
According to amicus briefs filed in an earlier appeal, Prometheus’s 
overly broad patent—like the Pallin patent that led to the Physician’s 
Immunity Statute—would have increased healthcare costs and 
decreased treatment effectiveness by interfering with physicians’ 
ability “to make informed treatment decisions based on the latest 
scientific knowledge.”
 
143  The Court weighed this and other concerns 
regarding preemption of future personalized medicine research 
against concerns about disincentivizing biotech and diagnostic 
research.  Building on the arguments laid out in his dissenting 
opinion in LabCorp, Justice Breyer explained that the process 
claim—especially the “highly general” step instructing physicians to 
“determine” metabolite levels—would “threaten to inhibit the 
development of more refined treatment recommendations that 
combine Prometheus’[s] correlations with later discovered features 
of the metabolites, human physiology or individual patient 
characteristics,” while leaving unanswered the question of “whether, 
from a policy perspective, increased protection for discoveries of 
diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.”144  The AMA welcomed the 
decision by stating that it prevented harm to patient care by 
protecting the availability of “critical scientific data” necessary for 
“sound patient care and innovative medical research.”145
 139. Id. at 1292. 
  In a way, 
 140. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
 141. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 142. Id. at 1301. 
 143. Margaret Kubick, An Uncertain Future: The Impact of Medical Process and 
Diagnostic Method Patents on Healthcare in the United States, 9 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 280, 290 (2010) (quoting Corrected Amici Curiae Brief for the Am. 
Coll. of Med. Genetics et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Prometheus 
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 144. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302, 1305.  
 145. Am. Med. Ass’n, Statement, AMA Welcomes Supreme Court Decision to 
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Mayo categorized Prometheus’s biotech process patent as a pure 
process, thereby addressing one of the policy gaps left by the 
Physician’s Immunity Statute.   
B. Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office  
After issuing its decision in Mayo, the Supreme Court remanded 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., to be 
reconsidered in light of Mayo.146  Prior to Mayo, the Federal Circuit 
had invalidated Myriad’s process claims directed at “comparing” and 
“analyzing” BRCA sequences as unpatentable abstract ideas.147  What 
remained valid amongst the challenged claims were one method 
claim, “a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics,” and 
composition of matter claims covering the isolated gDNA and cDNA 
sequences for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes (mutations of which are 
correlated with breast and ovarian cancer risk).148
In its decision on remand, the Federal Circuit reinstated its 
original disposition in its entirety.
   
149  The majority, written by Judge 
Lourie, explained that Myriad’s “composition claims are mere 
reflections of a law of nature . . . they are not, any more than any 
product of man reflects and is consistent with a law of nature,”150 and 
therefore, Mayo’s process patent analysis did “not control the 
question of patent-eligibility of . . . claims to compositions of 
matter.”151  Yet, as detailed at length above, this categorical 
distinction of precedent is hardly a bright line.  When the Supreme 
Court invoked Funk Bros. to apply the natural phenomenon doctrine 
to Benson, it clearly stated that for either a process or product, “the 
same principle applies.”152
Invalidate Prometheus Patents (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2012-03-20-supreme-court-decision-prometheus-
patents.page(quoted by THOMAS, supra note 
  As demonstrated in the previous section, 
this approach generally runs through Supreme Court precedent 
concerning the natural phenomenon doctrine.  Moreover, regardless 
of whether or not they precisely claim laws or products of nature, 
Myriad’s patents to isolated gDNA and cDNA effectively serve to 
5, at 10) (original source no longer 
accessible). 
 146. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (AMP v. 
USPTO), 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).  
 147. AMP v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1354 (2011).  
 148.  AMP v USPTO, 653 F.3d at 1357-58. 
 149. AMP v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1334 (2012). 
 150. Id. at 1331. 
 151. Id. at 1325. 
 152. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972). 
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preempt the use of both naturally occurring compositions of matter 
(genes) and laws of nature (the information coded for by genetic 
sequences).  In a dissenting opinion to the Federal Circuit’s decision, 
Judge Bryson explained that when a patent “claims a composition of 
matter that is nearly identical to a product of nature, it is appropriate 
to ask whether the applicant has done ‘enough’ to distinguish his 
alleged invention from the similar product of nature,” concluding 
that Myriad had not made a substantial “inventive contribution” or 
claimed anything more than a combination of “well-understood, 
routine, conventional” elements.153
The Federal Circuit’s holding was again appealed and granted 
certiorari, this time on the single question of whether or not human 
genes are patentable.
   
154  This time, Mayo’s suggestion that case law 
concerning the natural phenomenon doctrine is primarily driven by 
an avoidance of tying up the basic tools of science, rather than clear 
categorical exceptions,155 was found to be relevant to the question of 
patent-eligibility.  In a unanimous ruling (with the exception of some 
minor concurrences by Justice Scalia on biological explanations), 
Justice Thomas explained that isolated human gDNA is not patent 
eligible subject matter under § 101 because it constitutes a law of 
nature.  Specifically, the Court explained that: Myriad did not invent 
anything by isolating or locating the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but 
rather identified what already exists in nature; the relevant “patent 
descriptions simply detail the ‘iterative process’ of discovery by which 
Myriad narrowed the possible locations for the gene sequences that it 
sought;” the claims to isolated gDNA seek to cover the information 
contained in a genetic sequence rather than chemical compositions 
themselves; and deference to past USPTO practice was not persuasive 
in the absence of explicit statutory support for the patentability of 
isolated gDNA.156  In contrast, the Court explained that cDNA—with 
the exception of very short strands free from intervening introns—is 
patentable because it differs from naturally occurring DNA, which 
contains both introns and exons.157
 
 
 153. AMP v. USPTO, 689 F.3d at 1355 (Bryson, J., dissenting).  
 154. AMP v. USPTO, rev’d sub nom Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) 
(No. 12-398). 
 155. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1292 
(2012). 
 156. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetic, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118. 
 157. Id. at 1119.  
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C. Re-Envisioning the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine’s Preemption 
Rationale  
While Justice Breyer’s observation in Mayo that “a bright-line 
prohibition against patenting laws of nature . . . serves as a somewhat 
more easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ 
concern”158 is merely dicta, it suggests that the natural phenomenon 
doctrine is more concerned with the invention-preemption ratio than 
categorical limitations.  In other words, the doctrine may apply where 
a physical phenomenon preempts the use of a law of nature, or where 
an isolated version or a close replica of a physical phenomenon 
preempts the use of that phenomenon beyond what is warranted by 
the scope of invention. Along these lines, Yu has argued that perhaps 
isolated DNA should not be patented simply because it constitutes a 
source of biological information, even if it is not literally and exactly a 
physical phenomenon, law of nature or abstract idea.  As Yu explains, 
it is not clear that diagnostic innovations—which essentially look to 
nature for greater knowledge about the human body and then 
leverage this knowledge to track and diagnose disease—can be 
viewed as “inventions” rather than restatements of natural laws.159  
Under this approach, which echoes Flook (and, similarly, Justice 
Stevens’ concurrence in Bilski), an isolated version or a mirror image 
of a natural phenomenon—if it embodies naturally occurring 
information—would not be subject-matter eligible if issuing a patent 
on it would result in the preemption of all uses of that information.160
Such an approach defers to the spirit of the law, which more 
flexibly reaches those scientific advances that unpredictably redefine 
how medical technology interacts with nature.  As long as the biotech 
industry is more interested in designing around nature than using 
nature itself, a literal reading of the natural phenomenon doctrine 
would render it ineffective in barring monopolies that technically 
cover imitations of nature but effectively preempt uses of nature 
itself.  Feldman explains how this state of the art, which favors non-
naturally occurring phenomena over their naturally occurring 
counterparts, is embodied in cDNA: 
   
 158. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 159. Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility – a Disease and a Cure, 84 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 387, 401 (2011). 
 160. The argument against patentability may resound more strongly if a patent 
claim on an extraction or imitation of a physical phenomenon preempts not only its 
own use, but also the use of other laws of nature, as plaintiffs claim that Myriad’s 
gene patents do.  See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 13-17, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) [hereinafter Myriad]. 
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cDNA does not normally exist in the human body, and is 
naturally created only through the operation of certain 
retroviruses. Transforming normal DNA into cDNA, 
however, provides a more efficient tool for researchers and 
health care professionals who wish to study, diagnose, and 
treat the disease associated with a gene. In particular, cDNA 
is tailored to work with bacteria, the organisms commonly 
used to manipulate human genes and proteins in a 
laboratory setting. Bacteria do not have the machinery to 
shorten natural DNA, so we have to create special 
uninterrupted coding sequences for them. If given an 
uninterrupted coding sequence, bacteria can translate that 
sequence into the proper protein. Another advantage of 
cDNA over natural DNA is that the shorter length makes 
many laboratory procedures possible that could not be 
performed effectively with natural, full-length DNA.161
While there are a handful of other less efficient applications for 
naturally occurring gDNA, such as whole genome sequencing, most 
of these, if used to provide BRCA results, would “inevitably ‘isolate’ 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,”
 
162
After Myriad, cDNA patents are ideally positioned to nevertheless 
effectively monopolize the natural phenomena reflected in gDNA 
sequences.  In Myriad, the scope of preemption at issue was “the 
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.”
 offten creating, at least transitorily, 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 cDNA in the process.   
163  
While this information may be preempted both by patents on isolated 
gDNA and isolated cDNA, the Supreme Court only found isolated 
gDNA to fail the subject matter eligibility threshold.  Justice Thomas, 
writing for the Court, explained that the lab technician 
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.”164  
However it is clear that Justice Thomas did not equate “something 
new” with “something novel,” as he qualified the statement by 
clarifying in a footnote that the Court “express[es] no opinion 
whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory requirements of 
patentability.”165
 161. Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange 
Effects of Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1388 (2010-
2011). 
  And there are strong arguments that isolated cDNA 
may fail these requirements.  To make isolated cDNA, the isolated 
 162. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 160, at 15.   
 163. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at, 2109-10. 
 164. Id. at 2110. 
 165. Id. at 2119.  
34033_am




      10/28/2013   10:59:23
34033_amp 5-1  Sheet No. 38 Side A      10/28/2013   10:59:23
C M
Y K
BENEDICT_MACROFINAL10-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013 2:38 PM
2013] NATURE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 69 
gDNA is merely diluted in a specialized salt water mix, to which 
primers and a reverse transcriptase are added.  A PCR machine then 
processes the solution after creating amplified cDNA through a 
process of heating and cooling.  This process is well known in the art; 
here, as with the isolated gDNA, the principle contribution of the 
inventor is in locating the gene.  In Myriad, this inventive step, in the 
absence of any transformation from naturally occurring genes, was 
found to not be commensurate with the scope of preemption that 
would result from a patent on the isolated gDNA.  While the same 
conclusion might have been reached with regard to the cDNA, the 
analysis was not undertaken because, given the transformative step of 
removing introns, the cDNA did not resemble naturally occurring 
DNA.   
It is important to recognize that claims to cDNA monopolize the 
same genetic code as isolated gDNA; there is no difference between 
the information monopolized by a patent on isolated gDNA and one 
on cDNA because they both code for the same thing.  To a large 
extent, the same can be said of process claims involving cDNA and 
gDNA if they cover the only useful applications of isolated DNA.  
Reinforcing Justice Thomas’s point about monopolizing information 
rather than molecular structures, Myriad has initiated infringement 
suits against several companies that have begun producing BRCA1/2 
diagnostic tests that purport to use only the isolated gDNA of BRCA 
1/2.166
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Part III of this article, 
patentability requirements can be used to have the same limiting 
effect as patent eligibility standards.
  By maintaining its patent claims on cDNA and processes 
necessary for using isolated gDNA and cDNA, Myriad can effectively 
monopolize the same subject matter as it could with the isolated 
gDNA patents, because both isolated gDNA and cDNA are required 
for steps in the biotech process of diagnosing genetic susceptibility to 
breast and ovarian cancer. This feature of biotechnology products—
that renders them, primarily and essentially components of useful 
processes—is precisely what justifies a greater focus on the invention-
preemption ratio.   
167
 166. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. 
Ambry Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS (D. Utah July 9, 2013); Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., No. 
2:13-cv-00643-EJF (D. Utah, July 10, 2013).  
  Prior to Myriad, it was the 
long-held practice of the USPTO to grant patents on isolated gDNA.  
 167. See discussion of In re Kubin, supra note 87, King Pharms, Inc. v. Eon Labs, 
Inc., supra note 89, and Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., supra 
note 116. 
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It had been widely believed that because human DNA does not exist 
in nature in isolated form, isolated gDNA could be patented on the 
grounds that it is a product of human ingenuity.  This view relied on 
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., in which Judge Learned Hand 
found a patent on isolated adrenaline to be valid, noting that the 
inventor “was the first to make it available for any use by removing it 
from the other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of 
course possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it 
became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and 
therapeutically.”168  New life was breathed into Judge Learned Hand’s 
conclusion when the Federal Circuit cited it approvingly in finding 
purified vitamin B-12 to be patent-eligible subject matter.169  
However, as Judge Sweet noted in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO, Judge Learned Hand’s conclusion about the patentability of 
purified substances was merely dicta, as the question before him was 
one of novelty, not subject-matter eligibility.170  As Harkness points 
out, the historical reliance on Parke-Davis for the assertion that 
isolated products of nature are patent-eligible subject-matter is 
fundamentally misguided, because the inventor in that case had 
already convinced the patent examiner that the isolated compound 
was physically distinct from the non-isolated one.171
Thus, it is still possible that biotech patent standards may be 
calibrated to appropriately reflect the product-process entanglement 
of biotech claims.  In response to Myriad’s infringement suits, 
allegedly infringing companies can defend themselves by challenging 
Myriad’s patents on cDNA, such as claim 6 of the ‘282 patent (“An 
isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 2 
[which, referencing SEQ ID NO:1, covers cDNA]”) on the grounds of 
novelty or written description.  A novelty challenge could take the 
approach of considering the knowledge about the location and 
sequence of the BRCA 1/2 genes to be in the prior art.  Applying 
Diamond v. Diehr,
   
172
 168. 189 F. 95, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
 an alleged infringer of Myriad’s cDNA patents 
could argue that the precise location of the BRCA 1/2, as 
 169. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F. 2d 156 (4th Cir. 
1958). 
 170. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 224-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 171. Jon M. Harkness, Dicta on Adrenaline: Myriad Problems with Learned 
Hand’s Product-of-Nature Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford, 93 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 363 (2011).   
 172. 450 U.S. 175, 204 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-95 (1978)) 
(explaining that “the algorithm is treated for § 101 purposes as though it were a 
familiar part of the prior art; the claim is then examined to determine whether it 
discloses “some other inventive concept.’”).  
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unpatentable scientific knowledge, should be considered to be in the 
prior art, and that claims to cDNA lack “some other inventive step” 
because the process for isolating DNA and removing its introns is so 
well known in the prior art.  Alternatively, an alleged infringer could 
argue that claim 6 of Myriad’s ‘282 patent is overly broad and thus 
anticipated by any previously discovered gene which contains a string 
of 15 nucleotides (15mer) also found in BRCA 1.  Even though the 
written description describes BRCA 1 as having “no significant 
homology with known protein or DNA sequences,” it does not go so 
far as to suggest that absolutely no homology exists.  In fact, it is likely 
that several of BRCA 1’s 15mers can be found in a previously 
discovered gene.173
An alleged infringer could also challenge the validity of claim 6 of 
the ‘282 patent as broader than the written description.  While the 
written description only describes the BRCA 1 gene, claim 6—vis-à-vis 
its reference to SEQ ID NO: 1—covers 15mers known to exist in 
nearly every human chromosome.
  As an example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent 5,622,829 
claims the isolated cDNA of various BRCA 1 alleles, all of which 
contain far more than 15 nucleotides in common with claim 6 of 
Myriad’s ‘282 patent.   
174  This means that claim 6 
technically covers the DNA sequences of all other genes that contain 
a 15mer found in SEQ ID NO: 1.  In fact, this problem of overly 
broad claims is likely to be found in all cDNA patents: As 
documented by Rosenfeld and Mason, “an analysis of all current US 
patent claims and the human genome presented here shows that 
15mer sequences from all human genes match at least one other 
gene.”175  If successful in invalidating cDNA claims, these strategies 
could also be used to challenge process claims which merely apply 
natural laws by adding mental steps such as analyzing and comparing 
results, such as claim 2 of Myriad’s ‘857 patent.176
 173. A search of the NIH Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) for the 
third line of SEQ ID NO: 1 reveals that nearly every human chromosome contains a 





  Linking challenges 
 174. U.S. Pat. 5,622,829 (filed Apr. 19, 1995).  
 175. Jeffrey Rosenfeld & Christopher E. Mason, Pervasive Sequence Patents Cover 
the Entire Human Genome, 5 GENOMIC MED. 27 (2013).   
 176. “A method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast cancer in a human 
subject which comprises comparing the germline sequence of the BRCA2 gene or 
the sequence of its mRNA in a tissue sample from said subject with the germline 
sequence of the wild-type BRCA2 gene or the sequence of its mRNA, wherein an 
alteration in the germline sequence of the BRCA2 gene or the sequence of its mRNA 
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of cDNA claims to method claims in this way could serve to calibrate 
patentability standards in order to minimize overlapping scopes of 
preemption between related biotech claims. 
In the alternative, there are non-litigation means for promoting the 
spirit of the natural phenomenon doctrine.  For example, a recent 
petition by Senator Patrick Leahy to the NIH calls for march-in rights 
with respect to Myriad’s remaining patents on BRCA 1/2 diagnostic 
tests.177  March-in rights, as authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 203, allow 
federal agencies like the NIH to issue the equivalent of a compulsory 
license when “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs 
which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their 
licensees.”178  While the NIH has previously rejected march-in 
petitions concerning life-saving medicines being sold at unaffordable 
prices,179 the case of diagnostic biotech patents may be more 
compelling because cost is not the primary concern.  More 
problematically from a medical standpoint, exclusively licensed DNA 
patents prevent patient access to confirming (second-opinion) 
diagnostic tests—a problem which the USPTO was directed to 
explore with the passage of the America Invents Act.180
of the subject indicates a predisposition to said cancer.” U.S. Pat. 6,033,857 (filed 
Mar. 20, 1998).  
  If the primary 
concern of the natural phenomenon doctrine is unwarranted 
preemption of scientific tools, a liberal application of it in upholding 
diagnostic biotechnology patents—whether they be considered 
processes or products—may be compatible with the exercise of 
march-in rights.  By exercising march-in rights, the government could 
obtain the ability to sub-license cDNA patents (while reimbursing 
patentees through reasonable royalties) to avoid wholesale 
preemption of genetic sequence testing.  In doing so, it would 
promote the spirit of the law in avoiding absolute preemption of 
natural phenomena, while at the same time leveraging government 
funds to incentivize useful applications of natural phenomena.   
 177. Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy to Dr. Francis S. Collins, Director, Nat’l 
Inst. of Health (July 12, 2013), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/ 
download/07-12-13-pjl-to-nih-re_-myriad-march-in.  
 178. 35 U.S.C. 203(a)(2), Pub. L. 107-273 (2002).  
 179. Kevin E. Noonan, Groups Petition for NIH Exercise of March-in Rights Over 
Abbott Laboratories’ Norvir, PATENT DOCS – BIOTECH & PHARMA PATENT LAW & NEWS 
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/11/groups-petition-for-nih-
exercise-of-march-in-rights-over-abbott-laboratories-norvir.html.  
 180. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 27, 125 Stat. 338 
(2011). 
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D. The Importance of Safeguarding the Spirit of the Natural 
Phenomenon Doctrine at the Prosecution Stage 
The history of the entanglement of biomedical process patents with 
biomedical product patents provides some valuable lessons for future 
assessments of associated product and process claims in biotech 
patent applications.  For instance, when the scope of preemption 
appears to exceed the scope of invention for biotech claims 
resembling natural phenomena, “[f]orcing patents with abstract 
claims into a lower grade of patent might deter many of the current 
costs associated with abstract patent claims.”181
If the natural phenomenon doctrine was meant to exclude certain 
categories of discoveries from patentability before Congress had the 
opportunity to refine more specific patent validity rules, then perhaps 
it is more effective at carrying out that function at the outset of patent 
prosecution.  The natural phenomenon doctrine, as many examples 
in this article have shown, serves the important purpose of ensuring 
that patents do not contravene their Constitutional objective by too 
broadly preempting the use of basic scientific knowledge and tools.  
It does so by balancing the scope of preemption against the scope of 
invention (defined as the extent to which the claimed product is 
“markedly different” from what is found in nature), and ensuring 
that the scope of preemption does not exceed that which is justified 
by the inventor’s handiwork in applying, isolating or manipulating 
natural phenomena.  At the patent prosecution stage, the natural 
phenomenon doctrine may thus be a useful catch-all analytical tool 
that allows flexibility in promoting the spirit of patent law as it 
attempts to keep pace with the progress of science. Yet at the 
litigation stage, the doctrine perhaps proves too much: In the 
absence of a procedural mechanism to alter a patent at this stage, the 
natural phenomenon doctrine cannot be applied with sufficient 
nuance to limit the scope of preemption to the scope of invention.  
While the doctrine may be useful—and perhaps even ought to be 
more liberally construed—at the patent prosecution stage, it was not 
originally designed to be compatible with today’s patent litigation 
procedures as other statutory patentability requirements were.   
  Yet herein emerges a 
procedural limitation in applying an arguably antiquated doctrine to 
a separately conceived litigation process: at the litigation stage, it is 
not possible for courts to reinterpret or revise the form or scope of 
gene patents.   
 181. JEFFREY M. KUHN, Patentable Subject Matter Matters: New Uses For An Old 
Doctrine, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 89,112 (2007). 
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As a doctrine of limitation, it must, at the litigation stage, either 
prove nothing at the expense of unwarranted preemption or prove 
too much at the expense of patent holders who have been reasonably 
relying on guidance from the USPTO for many years.  At its 
inception, the natural phenomenon doctrine was simply not 
designed to fit within the bounds of contemporary patent litigation.  
So even though it may seem ideally fit for settling some of the more 
difficult questions raised by diagnostic biotech patents, it may be ill-
suited for regular deployment within the narrow space of today’s 
patent litigation process.  
Fortunately, in light of Myriad, the USPTO is expected to revisit its 
2012 Interim Procedure for Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of 
Process Claims Involving Laws of Nature182
CONCLUSION 
 to develop more 
permanent guidelines.  At minimum, these should account for the 
fact that patents on biotech products are likely to preempt the use of 
naturally occurring biotech processes.  For instance, functional 
claiming could be explicitly limited to those sequences which cannot 
be found in nature.  Guidelines to this effect could be especially 
useful as biotech patentees consider submitting reissue applications 
on patents that include claims to isolated gDNA, using narrower 
claims that explicitly exclude areas of overlap with naturally 
occurring phenomena.   
As statutory and judicial standards for biomedical process patents 
have evolved, they have responded both to changes in technology 
and public policy concerns.  Biomedical process patents have 
historically been viewed with skepticism because they allow 
monopolies on applications of medically relevant scientific truths and 
natural phenomena.  When the Physician’s Immunity Statute was 
passed in 1997, it only addressed the patentability implications of a 
narrow range of biomedical process patents, leaving similar issues 
related to biotechnology patentability unresolved. At the same time, 
another set of statutes sought to protect process patents for the 
 182. Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfield, Deputy Comm’r for Patent 
Examination Policy, USPTO, to Patent Examining Corps, USPTO (July 3, 2012), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/ 2012_interim_guidance.pdf 
(“While Mayo has provided additional details for the eligibility analysis that the 
Office developed after Bilski, the technology areas currently being addressed by the 
Federal Circuit, most notably in Myriad and Ultramercial, will provide insight 
regarding the full reach of Bilski and Mayo. The Office believes that the prudent 
course of action is to wait for resolution of these cases before issuing comprehensive 
updated guidance.”).  
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growing biotech industry, although they did little to address the 
increasingly complex doctrinal questions for the dual nature of 
biotech patents.  The uncertain legal status of associated process and 
product claims thus inevitably led to questions about the preemptive 
scope of these proliferating patents.  The Federal Circuit’s creation of 
new analytical tests strove to keep pace with innovation in new kinds 
of information- and technology-related processes, but the application 
of these tests to diagnostic biotechnology in particular proved to be 
short-lived.  Uniquely, diagnostic process patents raise fundamental 
doctrinal questions about what subject matter is eligible for patent 
protection in light of the tenuous legal relationships between 
naturally occurring biological processes, their manipulated 
counterparts and the natural information flows they effectively 
monopolize.  In this milieu, an analytical framework was needed that 
could properly account for the interconnected nature of 
compositions of matter and processes in biotechnology.  When 
Myriad reached the Supreme Court, the time was in a way ripe for 
application of the natural phenomenon doctrine, which retains the 
flexibility necessary to adapt to quickly changing modes of 
innovation. Indeed, a 2010 World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) study found that in many of its member states, it was not 
until relatively recently that “methods of medical treatment began to 
be seen more as a patent eligibility criterion stemming from public 
policy concerns.”183
As this article has shown, U.S. case law involving the natural 
phenomenon doctrine regularly interchanged precedent concerning 
product and process claims  Moreover, the natural phenomenon 
doctrine’s focus on the preemption-invention ratio renders it 
particularly suitable for application to diagnostic biotechnology due 
to the special problems that arise out of the process-product 
entanglement with biological information flows.  The natural 
phenomenon doctrine warrants limiting the scope of a diagnostic 
biotech product claim on the basis of its inventive scope (the extent 
to which the invention is “markedly different” from nature) being 
commensurate with its preemptive scope.  However, because a 
nuanced application of the natural phenomenon doctrine yields a 
result which is only ideally instructive at the patent prosecution stage, 
at the litigation stage, it can serve only to either substantially protect 
incentives for innovation in the biotechnology industry or to address 
 
 183. SHAMNAD BASHEER ET AL., WIPO STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, 
PATENT EXCLUSIONS THAT PROMOTE PUBLIC HEALTH OBJECTIVES, WIPO SCP/15/3 
Annex IV (2010). 
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the concerns about preemption of laws of nature; but it cannot 
properly balance the two.  Its role at the prosecution stage must 
therefore be taken very seriously.   
As processes become increasingly dependent on biology, “the 
impact of traditionally patentable subject matter upon the exercise of 
individual liberties grows,”184 and the imperative for nuanced scrutiny 
heightens.  After Myriad, claims to cDNA can still effectively 
monopolize the nature embodied in gDNA sequences. Myriad ‘s 
partial invalidity ruling—which has paved the way for more 
challenges to Myriad’s patents as defenses to infringement suits—
forces us to reconsider the relationship between biotech processes 
and compositions of matter that effectively monopolize the same 
subject matter.  Future developments in patent law concerning 
subject-matter eligibility for diagnostic biotech patents, such as 
revisions to patent prosecution guidelines, should explicitly account 
for the narrowing theoretical distinctions between processes and 
products in this field.  Certainly, biotechnology is not unique in this 
respect; many commentators have described how similar issues are 
raised by software and computer technologies.185  Indeed, the 
shortsighted solution offered by the Biotechnology Process Patent Act 
has been compared to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 
another “statute that was tied specifically to a technology that quickly 
became outdated.”186
 
  From a birds-eye view, the complexities that 
arise out of trying to apply traditional patent frameworks to new 
boundary-defying technologies shed light on the shortcomings of a 
uniform patent system in adequately calibrating the progress of 
science within any given field.  
 
 184. John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
569, 610 (2002). 
 185. See, e.g., Andrea Bonacccorsi et al., From Protecting Texts to Protecting 
Objects in Biotechnology and Software: A Tale of Changes of Ontological 
Assumptions in Intellectual Property Protection, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 611, 633 (2011). 
 186. Kristin Connarn, supra note 49, at 300. 
